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Précis
Despite ethical concerns about gene patents, virtually no empirical evidence exists to support
claims about either positive or negative effects, and extremely little is known about the
intellectual property protection strategies of firms and universities. This article discusses the
results of a pilot study to examine patenting and licensing philosophies, policies, and practices
of different types of institutions and to describe the contractual conditions for licensing DNA
sequence inventions.
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A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA Inventions
Michelle R. Henry
Mildred K. Cho
Meredith A. Weaver
Jon F. Merz¶

Intellectual property in biotechnology invention provides important incentives for research and
development leading to advances in genetic tests and treatments.1 However, there have been
numerous concerns raised regarding the negative effect patents on gene sequences and their
practical applications may have on clinical research and the availability of new medical tests and
procedures.2 One concern is that licensing policies attempting to capture for the benefit of the
licensor valuable rights to downstream research results and products may increase the financial
risks and diminish potential payoffs of – and therefore motivation for – performing downstream
research and development.3 In addition, very broad patent claims allowed by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, the sheer growth in patents claiming genetic sequences, and threats of
overlapping patents create a veritable minefield for researchers in both academia and industry.
The concern is that research may be stifled because of the high cost and hassle of negotiating
access. Despite the ethical and policy concerns about gene patents, virtually no empirical
evidence exists to support claims about either positive or negative effects.4 Importantly,
extremely little is known about the licensing behavior of firms and universities. To begin to
examine emerging licensing issues for patents claiming genetic sequences, examine how gene-
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based technology is propagating, and understand how patents are influencing the sharing and use
of fundamental genetic inventions, we performed this pilot interview study.

METHODS
We developed an open-ended telephone interview guide and piloted it with two technology
transfer executives. The interview guide first examines patenting and out-licensing strategies,
including the process of determining what gets patented and to whom licenses are granted. Then,
we asked several questions addressing license negotiations, including issues of exclusivity,
research or diagnostic uses of patented sequences, and particular terms that are difficult to
negotiate. Finally, we asked about protecting nonpatented genetic technologies, and the use of
Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) and Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs).
We identified institutions that have patented human nucleic acid sequence inventions by
searching the Delphion patent database for patents in U.S. class 435/6 (molecular biology,
involving nucleic acid sequence) that have “Seq. I.D.” in their claims.5 We identified forty-eight
for-profit companies and sixty-two non-profit institutions that were assigned three or more
patents (mean number of patents held = 19.4, range = 3–192). We excluded all foreign
institutions. We included in our sample thirty-three non-profit institutions (thirty-two universities
or research centers, and one institute in the National Institutes of Health (NIH)) and thirty-two
companies; for analysis purposes, we treated the NIH as a non-profit institution. We selected the
ten companies and ten non-profit institutions assigned the highest number of patents, and then
randomly selected twenty-two companies and twenty-two institutions from the remaining
samples of those who held three or more patents. We oversampled firms to address a concern
that company technology transfer executives would be less willing to participate.
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During August and September of 2001, we called the technology transfer, licensing, or
legal departments of these organizations, identified the individual or individuals responsible for
genetic technology licensing, and attempted to conduct phone interviews regarding their
patenting and licensing strategies and practices.
At the conclusion of the interviews, we requested copies of respondents’ standard
(template) licensing agreements relevant to sequence inventions. We also asked that a licensed
patent or technology be chosen, and copies of license documents be mailed to us, with redaction
of any specific information that our respondents believed would be commercially sensitive (e.g.,
licensor and licensee identity, covered technology, payment amounts). We secured the agreement
of a University of Pennsylvania law professor to act as a third party for collecting and ensuring
the anonymity of licensing agreements. We sent a fax or email reminder for the collection of
agreements to respondents two weeks after the interviews.
After initial review of the interview data, we found that several respondents mentioned
the term “research tool” in their discussions regarding the distinction between the research and
clinical or diagnostic use of a patent. To better understand what was meant by this term, we sent
an email follow-up question to twenty-seven respondents for whom we had email addresses
asking them to clarify and define the term and give examples.
This study was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Committee on Studies
Involving Human Beings, and by Stanford’s Administrative Panel on Human Subjects in Nonmedical Research. Oral informed consent was secured over the telephone from participants
following a description of the study. All but two interviews were conducted by one of us (MRH),
and responses were recorded in the form of written notes.

4

Qualitative analysis of the interviews and license agreements were conducted. Two of the
authors (MRH and JFM) developed a coding strategy and performed the coding.

RESULTS
We contacted sixty-five organizations. Of these, nineteen did not participate. Five technology
transfer executives contacted did not return phone calls; three said that although they were the
correct contact at their organization, they did not have enough experience to help; five declined
because of a staffing shortage or heavy workload; five declined as part of a policy not to
participate in interviews or because they simply had received too many requests to participate in
them; and one declined without explanation. We conducted interviews with representatives of
nineteen of thirty-two companies (59%) and twenty-seven of thirty-three non-profit institutions
(82%) (χ2 = 3.96, p < 0.05), for a total sample of forty-six organizations. Our final response
rates from the initial sample were nineteen of forty-eight firms (40%) and twenty-seven of sixtytwo non-profits (44%). There was no relationship between number of patents held and
willingness to participate for either firms or non-profit institutions. We received a total of ten
anonymized license agreements and standard licensing templates. In this paper, we present the
results of the interviews only.
Patenting strategies
Our results show that respondents in universities have different patenting strategies than those
representing commercial entities. We asked respondents to describe their strategies for patenting
DNA sequences. There were two predominant models that emerged, largely associated with the
profit-status of the organization. Five respondents from companies, and only one respondent
from a non-profit, discussed maintaining patent portfolios as part of their overall business
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strategy. These firms detailed a “blocking” approach to keep others out of an intellectual
property area and a “defensive” approach to defend a stake in an area. These firms mentioned
strategies such as filing patent applications for all inventions and then dropping technologies
later if there was no commercial interest, patenting only those technologies related to current
programs or interests, and patenting as a way to prevent others from commercializing. Non-profit
institutions appeared to be more selective. Respondents from fifteen non-profit institutions and
three companies stated that determining patentability (novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness)
is a necessary step in the patenting strategy. Demonstrating that an invention meets these
requirements is mandatory for all patent applications, and the added emphasis placed on this step
suggests that non-profits may undertake a more careful and discriminatory approach to deciding
what merits filing a patent application.
This difference in selectivity is evident when the number of invention disclosures
received is compared to the number of patent applications respondents had filed on nucleic acid
sequence inventions in the prior two-year period. Excluding one extreme outlier from our
sample, companies reported that they received an average of thirty-seven invention disclosures
(range = 0–100) and filed an average of thirty-two patent applications (86%) in the last two
years. Non-profits received an average of 163 disclosures (range = 0–600) and filed an average
of twenty-four applications (15%). A recent study conducted by Mowery et al., examining the
practices of three university technology transfer offices (Stanford, Columbia, and the University
of California system) similarly found that between 1986 and 1990, disclosure to application
filing rates of these academic institutions were between 15% and 17%.6

Licensing strategies
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We asked about strategies for licensing out technology, including methods for finding
licensees, preferred licensing positions, difficulties in negotiations, and ways in which
nonpatented nucleic acid sequences are protected.
Marketing and purpose of out-licensing
Companies and non-profits granted licenses to their DNA sequence patents at a relatively
similar rate (42% of firms’ total owned portfolio of DNA sequence patents versus 51% of nonprofits’) but reported differing strategies for finding a licensee to commercialize their
technologies. Non-profits were more likely than firms to report careful market analysis to ensure
a patent would be licensed even prior to the filing for a patent application. Six non-profit
institutions actively market to attract potential licensees, while no respondents from commercial
firms noted this as part of their licensing strategy. Three respondents from commercial firms
mentioned a preference for cross-licensing and five noted a strategy of licensing out technologies
of no immediate interest, while respondents from non-profit institutions did not comment on
either strategy. Licensing was essentially used only to transfer inventions into industry for
commercialization, and licensing to universities by companies was the exception with only four
firms saying that they have licensed to universities.
Character of licensees
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, patent holders of products resulting from federally sponsored research
must demonstrate preference in licensing to small businesses.7 Perhaps reflecting compliance
with this federal requirement, six respondents from non-profit institutions expressed a preference
for licensing out to small companies and start-ups. Two companies and thirteen non-profit
institutions said that they were willing to accept equity and payment plans involving higher
royalties, as well as milestone payments in lieu of large up-front sums, from these small
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companies. Regardless of profit status or size, fourteen respondents remarked that smaller
companies were easier to work with than either large or mid-size for-profit organizations or nonprofit institutions. Likewise, fourteen respondents noted that having a previous successful
relationship with the licensee or experience in negotiating licenses for other gene sequence
patents made the deal go more smoothly.
Exclusivity
We were interested in examining the usage patterns and prevalence of exclusive versus
nonexclusive licensing. There were wide disparities in reported strategies, ranging from those
who grant only exclusive licenses to those who grant no exclusive licenses, with the majority
using them selectively. In a previous study of a select sample of genetic diagnosis patents,
Schissel et al. found that exclusive licenses were frequently used by non-profit universities and
hospitals.8 Here, we found that companies were substantially less likely than non-profits to
license DNA sequence inventions exclusively. Of all licenses ever granted to these technologies,
companies reported an average of 27% to be exclusive (standard deviation = 38.1, range = 0–
100%) compared to 68% of those granted by non-profits (standard deviation = 26.0, range = 0–
100%) (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution p = 0.001).
We also asked respondents under what circumstances exclusive licensing is used. Six
respondents stated that exclusive licenses were used as incentives to attract licensees.
Additionally, two non-profits mentioned that they offered exclusive licenses to small companies.
Respondents from five companies and seven non-profit organizations noted the use of
nonexclusive licenses for access to research tools and non-patented materials, and two firms and
two non-profit organizations noted a preference for nonexclusive licenses in general. Further
reflecting wide variation of licensing strategies, one respondent noted the sole use of exclusive
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licenses for diagnostic applications while another emphasized the use of nonexclusive licenses
for these. Respondents also commented on the nature of both exclusive and nonexclusive
licenses, saying that as part of their strategies, revenues generated from exclusive licenses must
cover patent costs and have milestones, while nonexclusive licenses allow more leeway in
negotiating financial terms (including the amounts and timing of payments, and the taking of
equity).
Research versus clinical uses and research tools
In light of concerns that licensing arrangements may stifle downstream research as well as the
ability of industry to develop diagnostic or predictive tests that are based on patented genes or
disease-gene associations, we asked if respondents distinguish between research and clinical or
diagnostic uses in licensing.
Fourteen companies and twenty-three non-profit institutions indicated that they
distinguish between research and clinical uses in the licensing of nucleic acid sequence
inventions. When asked to define the term “research,” twelve respondents defined research as
noncommercial use, seven defined the term as “internal” research and development, four said
that research does not require regulatory approval (apparently distinguishing FDA-approved
products), and four commented that commercial firms are unable by definition to perform
noncommercial research. Six respondents said that they reserved the right to continue with their
own institution’s research when they licensed out technology. Six respondents said that they
made the distinction between research and clinical uses by granting field of use licenses. Overall,
thirty-six of the forty-six respondents noted generally that they resort to field of use or claim
limitations to facilitate dividing a patent into multiple licenses as well as to retain rights to
continue their own use of the invention.
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Several respondents broached the topic of research tools during this discussion.
Respondents from one commercial firm and six non-profit institutions said that research tools
should be licensed nonexclusively and widely disseminated. Two interviewees commented that
DNA is a research tool, one said that non-human genes are research tools, and one noted that
their licensing arrangements for research tools do not include reach-through provisions or
royalties.
To better understand what technologies fall under the term “research tool,” we emailed
twenty-seven respondents who had provided their email addresses during the initial interview,
and asked them to define “research tool” and provide examples of inventions that they consider
tools and those they do not. Eleven interviewees (41%) responded, all via email. In general,
research tools were described as “a composition, sequence, method or process” that is useful in
biomedical research for discovering, verifying, or studying another material or process.
Respondents discussed the development, patenting, and licensing of technologies they
considered to be research tools. Respondents commented that tools do not require much
development in order to be useful (n = 3), do not require patent protection because they “would
not become a commercial product or part of a product” (n = 3), are typically licensed
nonexclusively (n = 2), and should not be subjected to reach-through terms (n = 2).
Of the nucleic acid sequence technologies that could be considered research tools,
respondents cited the Cohen Boyer Recombinant DNA technology (U.S. Pat. No. 4,237,224),
DNA vectors and probes, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) primers, and genes themselves.
Among the materials that respondents gave as examples of gene sequence technologies that are
not research tools were materials being used to develop a diagnostic test, those that have
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potential therapeutic use, such as the monoclonal antibody that is currently being used as a
treatment for Crohn’s Disease, and biological reagents with diagnostic or commercial potential.
Two respondents representing non-profit institutions specifically noted the distinction
between a “tool” and a “target.” One of these respondents commented that “a drug target or a
disease diagnostic is not generally considered a research tool,” and the other remarked “genes
that are drug targets are viewed by large companies as research tools, but small companies feel
that they are not research tools” (emphasis was the respondent’s own). Several respondents noted
that often a technology used as an investigative tool by one organization was itself originally
researched and developed into an end product by another. It is evident from the responses that
the definition is in part attributable to the perspective of the organization, and encompasses the
intended use of the material.
Licensing experiences
Terms negotiated
In an attempt to determine whether research or other activities have been inhibited or facilitated
by patents and licenses, we asked whether any licensing negotiations failed, and if so, how many
in the last year, why, and what licensing terms were most problematic. In the negotiation of
licenses, material transfer agreements (MTAs) and nondisclosure agreements (NDAs), each party
has contractual terms and conditions that are sticking points, as well as some specific issues that
could potentially break the deal. We were interested in looking at the most common terms
negotiated, whether or not these were the same across all types of negotiations, and whether they
were related to the profit status or size of the organization. (see Table 1).
(Insert Table 1 about here)
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In licensing agreements, three main areas of difficulty arose: payment terms, terms that
shift contract risks, and the retention of rights to downstream development (so-called reachthrough clauses). Determining the value of a technology is a critical step in developing a solid
licensing plan, and other financial terms, such as royalty schedules and amounts, are based on
this initial assessment. Financial terms, including the amount of upfront payment, royalty rates,
and milestone payments, were the most prevalent source of disagreement. Another area of
difficulty for both companies and non-profit institutions was negotiating and defining rights to
the use of the invention and subsequently derived products. Overall, respondents conveyed the
idea that the licensor often wishes to retain rights to future intellectual property, as well as rights
to continue work with the licensed technology, and the licensee often wishes to gain the right to
sublicense the invention. Contract risks, including issues of indemnification, warranties,
enforcement and due diligence, were the third most troublesome to negotiate.
Rights to future intellectual property
Most licensing programs involving DNA sequence inventions must account for downstream
technologies derived from the invention. Respondents stated that agreeing on the distribution of
reward from future discoveries and developments from the licensed invention is among the most
difficult issues in licensing of patents (n = 18), MTAs (n = 25), and NDAs (n = 2). Reachthrough clauses are a leading concern, regardless of profit status or size of the licensor
organization, and were cited by four interviewees as a cause for negotiation breakdown.
Negotiation breakdown
Nearly three-quarters of all respondents (n = 33) said that they had at least one
negotiation break down without agreement in the past year. Sixteen respondents representing
commercial firms reported at least one negotiation in the past year that was not completed, and
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seventeen representatives of non-profits responded similarly. Financial terms, as described
above, were the primary cause of failed negotiations (n = 24), followed by problems with
agreeing on the field and scope of use (n = 6). The next largest causes of negotiation failures
were not term related, but rather personality conflict (n = 2) or a diminished interest in
completing the deal (n = 3).
Material transfer agreements and nondisclosure agreements
All respondents reported using MTAs and NDAs for protection of nonpatented proprietary
information and materials. Only one respondent reported that MTAs were not required, although
they were still used in most transfers of materials into the institution and out to both for-profit
and non-profit institutions. According to respondents, MTAs are used for unprotected (i.e.,
unpatented) or nonvaluable materials that are to be evaluated by potential licensees, or materials
or data that are being used purely for research purposes. Ten companies and seventeen
universities said that they used MTAs with both universities and companies. Four respondents
commented that they used two templates, one for transfer to industry and the other to non-profit
institutions, while seven universities specifically said that they used the Uniform Biological
Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) drafted by the National Institutes of Health.9
Most respondents commented that of all negotiations, NDAs were the simplest, most
standardized, and least troublesome. This is evidenced by the fact that there were only eight
sticking points mentioned in NDA negotiations, compared to seventeen in licensing agreements,
and twelve in MTA negotiations. (see Table 2)
(Insert Table 2 about here)
We asked the question how – aside from the use of patent licenses, MTAs, and NDAs –
are nucleic acid sequence technologies protected. A few respondents mentioned tangible research
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material licenses or tangible property licenses (n = 2) and bailments (n = 2). In discussing these
alternatives, respondents commented that tangible research material licenses for research use
require less negotiation, and therefore less time, and have fewer risks than do standard patent
licenses. Bailments were described as a stronger form of transfer than MTAs, falling in between
MTAs and licenses, and restricting use for research purposes only. Bailments were used with
commercial entities, and were always nonexclusive.
Licensing agreement collection
Despite the firewall safeguards we set in place (i.e., securing the agreement of a law professor to
collect and anonymize agreements), respondents were, for the most part, unwilling to provide us
with copies of negotiated agreements. The primary reasons for refusal were that respondents
were simply too busy to devote the time involved in choosing an appropriate license agreement
and removing identifying information from it, or were concerned that they would have to secure
approvals from their licensees because of confidentiality clauses.

DISCUSSION
There are two primary findings of this pilot study. First, our results suggest that companies and
non-profit institutions differ in patenting selectivity and patterns of exclusive license use. Forprofit respondents reported the more expensive strategy of broadly filing patent applications,
compared to the strategy of non-profit respondents (who received more invention disclosures
than firms) of selective filing. Second, we find that non-profit academic, health-care, and
research institutions are slightly more likely to license their DNA sequence inventions than forprofit firms, and are much more likely to grant exclusive licenses to these patents.
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For comparison, a survey of academic technology transfer executives showed that
roughly 50% of licenses granted by universities in 1999 are exclusive,10 while only about 22%
of licenses granted by the NIH in 2001, and fewer than 16% of active licenses managed by the
NIH Office of Technology Transfer, are exclusive.11 Thus, the use of exclusive licenses by nonprofit institutions seems to exceed that of firms for the same technology, as well as the use by
universities and the NIH for all technologies.
The asymmetries in patenting and licensing strategies may be related. These disparities
may suggest a fundamental difference in the types of invention generated by companies and nonprofit institutions (primarily universities). As previously indicated, numerous respondents noted
a difference between research tools and research targets, commenting that the definition is
partially attributable to the perspective of the organization, and encompasses the intended use of
the material. Respondents also stated that tools useful for performing research should be licensed
nonexclusively and be made broadly available, while exclusive licensing was viewed as
necessary to promote investment in downstream research on promising targets and development
of products.12 Basic sequences are useful as targets for downstream development of therapies,
and previous research by Thomas et al. showed the predominance of universities and other
public institutions in basic genetic discovery.13 Therefore, the high prevalence of exclusive
licensing by universities may reflect a desire to make targets available for development while the
less extensive use of exclusive licenses by companies suggests that firms are less likely to license
targets to others for development, that their research does not generate targets, or that targets are
simply a smaller fraction of their research product.14
The high proportion of exclusive licenses by non-profits raises the implication that
invention coming out of non-profit institutions is more likely to be tied up with exclusive rights.
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However, our results, and those of Mowery et al.15 show that only 15% of university DNA
sequence inventions are patented, suggesting that the bulk of such inventions will be made freely
available upon scientific publication. Non-profit inventions (as defined by invention disclosures)
are much less likely to be patented at all, are slightly more likely to be licensed and, if licensed,
are much more likely to be on an exclusive basis. However, since universities are not in the
business of making, using, or selling patented products or services, they use patents for licensing
out their technologies so that they may be further developed. The authors do not know of any
cases of universities patenting either offensively or defensively.16 Thus, overall, the majority of
DNA sequence based inventions generated in non-profit institutions appear not to be patented or
licensed, and therefore not bound up by intellectual property claims.
Aside from somewhat uniform treatment of research tools, our study shows that there is
no standard approach of institutions to exclusive licensing, and our respondents reported
practices that vary widely. For example, the disagreement about the exclusivity of diagnostics
suggests that there is no broad agreement in the biotechnology market about how best to move an
invention into use, particularly when little or no further development is required. This poses
some difficult questions regarding the best use of government-funded inventions, including those
developed in academic institutions.17 Importantly, exclusivity may be inappropriate if the sole
licensee of a technology restricts public access in some way, thereby undermining the goal of
federal funding benefiting the general public. Bayh-Dole mandates that preference be given to
small businesses in licensing government-funded technology exclusively. All respondents from
non-profit institutions reported that they license to small businesses. Small – and particularly
start-up – businesses, in turn, may require exclusive rights to establish competitive advantage
and give them access to high-risk capital. The prevalence of exclusive licenses granted by non-
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profits may reflect the preference for licensing to small businesses mandated by Bayh-Dole,
although we cannot determine this based on our results. If this is so, then an unintended
consequence of the preference may be the frequent use of exclusive arrangements in transfer of
technology discovered with federal monies. Exclusive licensing raises several concerns,
including the risk that competition might be stifled as firms are prevented from pursuing
particular areas of research. The problem posed may be compounded if the small business
preference results in licensing of parties who are not in the best position to move an invention
toward commercial viability, due to limited access to capital and other resources (including, for
example, access to underlying intellectual property and technical know-how as well as personnel
with necessary competencies).
Companies were more likely to adopt a broad patenting strategy to develop portfolios that
could be used to block others from developing an area or to defend the firm’s ability to work in a
particular field. Broad patenting can be used by companies to ensure return on investments, to
give them bargaining power with competitors and collaborators, and, defensively, to protect their
ability to work and compete in a particular field or area. Non-profits were more likely to report
that they undertook careful market analysis to ensure a patent would be used before filing.
Several non-profit respondents reported filing provisional patent applications to retain rights to
an invention while exploring whether there was a market for the invention.
There are continuing concerns that an increase in use of the patent system to divvy up
proprietary rights to the human genome may delay dissemination of research tools among
scientists, and therefore hinder or even stifle research. The 1998 Report of the National Institutes
of Health Working Group on Research Tools addressed difficulties for biomedical researchers in
negotiating access to research tools. The Working Group broadly defined research tools to
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include all resources used in the laboratory, and to exclude all that would be sold to nonresearch
consumers. Included in this definition are “cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and
computer software.”18 The Working Group advised that guiding principles regarding the transfer
of research tools acceptable across all segments of the biomedical research community be
developed. Although those who responded to our question regarding the definition of nucleic
acid sequence research tools did not differ greatly in their interpretations, there was no single
approach to defining the difference between the research and clinical or diagnostic use of a
nucleic acid sequence. Respondents’ definitions of each of these terms varied extensively (e.g.,
the definition of “clinical” ranged in meaning from an entrance into clinical trials to being a term
interchangeable with “commercialization”).
Furthermore, overvaluation of new technologies may be common among the discoverers
and was cited by several respondents as a barrier to successful negotiations. We believe that this
problem will persist in the short term, but ultimately market forces will result in greater
consensus regarding valuation, as licensing and technology transfer executives gain experience
and successfully move inventions into the development pipeline.
STUDY LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations of this study. First, this was a pilot study of a limited number of
licensing and technology transfer managers in universities, government agencies, and companies,
and was not designed to estimate the frequency with which issues and problems arise. Second,
we asked about a very narrow class of invention, nucleic acid sequences, and it is quite likely
that respondents generalized from their broader licensing experiences to this narrowly defined
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class of invention. However, this is not necessarily a problem because it may indicate that they
treat these inventions the same as other technologies that they patent and license.
Finally, respondents stated that agreeing on the distribution of reward from future
discoveries and developments from the licensed invention is among the most difficult issues they
face in licensing. We did not collect detailed information from respondents regarding what
specific terms are being negotiated or how the issue is being resolved. Further study of this issue
is warranted to understand how the market is distributing the long-term financial benefits and
risks of gene-based discoveries and downstream developments.
CONCLUSION
The results presented in this paper demonstrate widely varying strategies used by companies and
universities to protect gene sequence discoveries and to commercialize their gene sequence
patents. Further, we find that there are several main areas of contention in negotiating access to
these technologies, particularly those involving the distribution of the financial risks and
potential benefits resulting from downstream developments. Further study is necessary to
evaluate whether these practices, or the asymmetry between companies and non-profit
organizations, have effects on the diffusion of technologies and the ability of university and
commercial researchers to conduct research and bring gene-based products to market.
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Table 1: Difficult Issues in Licensing Negotiation

Financial terms (amounts of and timing of payments,
the taking of equity)
Future intellectual property/sub-licensing (distribution
of reward from future discoveries and developments)
Indemnification/warranties
Scope of patent, license, or field of use
Due diligence (insurance that the technology will not
languish)
Patent prosecution costs
Retention of rights to continue own use of the
invention for research
Enforcement of patent rights
Choice of law/venue
Publication (concerns about delay and control)
Nonfinancial terms (respondents specifically
commented that difficulties were not financial)
Duration of agreement
Assignment of patent costs
Exclusivity
Other (third-party-sponsored research, rights of first
refusal)
None
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Nonprofit For-Profit Total
n = 27 (%) n = 19 (%) n = 46 (%)
18 (67)
12 (63)
30 (65)
9 (33)

9 (47)

18 (39)

7 (26)
3 (11)
4 (15)

4 (21)
7 (37)
1 (5)

11 (24)
10 (22)
5 (11)

4 (15)
4 (15)

0 (0)
0 (0)

4 (9)
4 (9)

1 (4)
3 (11)
2 (7)
3 (11)

2 (11)
0 (0)
1 (5)
0 (0)

3 (7)
3 (7)
3 (7)
3 (7)

1 (4)
2 (7)
0 (0)
2 (7)

1 (5)
0 (0)
2 (11)
2 (11)

2 (4)
2 (4)
2 (4)
4 (9)

1 (4)

(0)

1 (2)

Table 2: Difficult Issues by Type of Agreement

Financial terms (amounts of and timing of payments,
the taking of equity)
Future intellectual property/sub-licensing (distribution
of reward from future discoveries and developments)
Indemnification/warranties
Scope of patent, license, or field of use
Due diligence (insurance that the technology will not
languish)
Patent Prosecution
Retention of rights to continue own use of the
invention for research
Enforcement
Choice of law/venue
Publication (concerns about delay and control)
Non-financial terms (respondents specifically
commented that difficulties were not financial)
Duration of agreement
Assignment of patent costs
Exclusivity
Definition of materials
Writing requirements (putting confidentiality
agreement into writing)
Injunctive relief
Confidentiality (what is confidential, how many
people are allowed access to confidential information)
Other (third-party-sponsored research, rights of first
refusal)
None
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Licenses
MTA
NDA
n = 46 (%) n = 46 (%) n = 46 (%)
30 (65)
1 (2)
1 (2)
18 (39)

25 (54)

2 (4)

11 (24)
10 (22)
5 (11)

3 (7)
3 (7)
0 (0)

1 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)

4 (9)
4 (9)

1 (2)
0 (0)

0 (0)
0 (0)

3 (7)
3 (7)
3 (7)
3 (7)

0 (0)
1 (2)
15 (33)
0 (0)

0 (0)
5 (11)
1 (2)
0 (0)

2 (4)
2 (4)
2 (4)
0 (0)
0 (0)

2 (4)
1 (2)
0 (0)
2 (4)
1 (2)

21 (46)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
5 (11)

0 (0)
1 (2)

0 (0)
1 (2)

2 (4)
6 (13)

3 (7)

1 (2)

0 (0)

1 (2)

1 (2)

0 (0)

